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SUMMARY JURY TRIALS: IS THERE
AUTHORITY FOR FEDERAL JUDGES TO
IMPANEL SUMMARY JURORS?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure guarantee a "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action"1 for all litigants in the United States
federal courts. Yet, the United States has become an increasingly litigious
society, making the guarantee of a'just and speedy trial difficult for the federal
courts to uphold.2 Although scholars disagree as to the cause of America's
increased litigation, 3 none deny that this increase has created a severe backlog
problem in the federal court system.4 In an effort to alleviate the backlog
problem, scholars and judges have proposed solutions such as the use of
magistrates, 5 pretrial conferences,' and the creation of additional judgeships.7
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 states: "These rules . . . shall be construed to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."
2. Chief Justice Warren Burger has stated:
One reason our courts have become overburdened is that Americans are increasingly
turning to courts for relief from a range of personal distresses and anxieties. Remedies
for personal wrongs that once were considered the responsibility of institutions other
than the courts are now boldly asserted as legal "entitlements." The courts have been
expected to fill the void created by the decline of family, and neighborhood unity.
Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982). One commentator
has estimated that by the year 2000, federal appellate courts will decide one million cases. John H.
Barton, Behind the Legal Erplosion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 567, 567 (1975); cf Frank E. A. Sander,
Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976).
3. See Burger, supra note 2, at 274. But see Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and
Other Methods of Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366, 389
(1986) (arguing that federal courts are overutilized, a problem that could be solved by increasing the
minimum amount in controversy in diversity cases, increasing filing fees, or increasing state courts'
legal responsibilities).
4. In 1990, 258,961 civil and criminal cases were filed, 55,000 more cases than were filed in
1989. Civil filings have decreased 24% since the 1985 high of 278,778. 211,626 civil cases were
filed in U.S. district courts in 1990. While total civil filings have declined, filings of complex cases
such as civil rights suits and labor suits have continued to increase. Fewer civil cases were
terminated in 1990, down six percent to 212,497. Despite the decline in total pending cases, the
number of cases pending three years or more has climbed eight percent, from 25,222 to 27,254,
since 1989. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics,
Dec. 31, 1990, at 3-6.
5. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 631-39 (West 1968 & Supp. 1991) (providing for the appointment, use,
compensation, and jurisdiction of United States Magistrates).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 16. "Clause (7) explicitly recognizes that it has become commonplace to
discuss settlement at pretrial conferences. Since it obviously eases crowded court dockets and results
in savings to the litigants and the judicial system, settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage
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More radical proposals argue for the elimination of both diversity jurisdiction
and jury trials! The diverse solutions proposed to remedy the backlog problem
are not limited to the litigation phase.9
In 1983, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to provide for
increased judicial involvement in the pretrial phase of litigation and to encourage
settlement through the use of extrajudicial and alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) methods.' ° ADR can take the form of mediation, negotiation, or
arbitration." One particularly effective, yet controversial, method of ADR is
the Summary Jury Trial (SJT).' 2
The summary jury trial is a pretrial settlement technique that serves as a
catalyst for settlement negotiations. 13 The SJT is a brief procedure in which
in the litigation as possible." FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee's note.
7. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 133 (West 1968 & Supp. 1991) (providing for the appointment and
number of United States District Court Judges).
8. Posner, supra note 3, at 389 (arguing that federal courts are overutilized and that lasting
reforms can be achieved only by increasing the amount in controversy and increasing the filing fees).
But cf Thomas D. Lambros & Thomas H. Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
43, 44 (1980) (arguing that eliminating diversity jurisdiction and jury trials will ruin valuable aspects
of the United States judicial system).
9. See infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text (discussing pretrial settlement, particularly the
summary jury trial).
10. 1985 CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY. Easing the courts'
loaded dockets is not the only reason for using ADR. As Justice Brennan stated:
A case settled is a case best disposed of because then one of the parties certainly avoids
the heartache of losing at trial. Settlements are voluntary, consensual and not coerced
and when the terms are understood by the parties, settlements are preferred to
adjudication. If this premise is accepted, the basic purpose of our courts is best
accomplished by assuring that lawyers are prepared to settle the case.
DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, 6 (Roscoe Pound Foundation)
[hereinafter DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES].
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note. "In addition to settlement, Rule 16(c)(7)
refers to exploring the use of procedures other than litigation to resolve the dispute. This includes
urging the litigants to employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse." Id.
12. This note will focus on SIT as a method of dispute resolution. Explanation of other types
of alternative dispute resolution is beyond the scope of this note. For an overview of other types
of ADR, see WAYNE BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT, A HANDBOOK FOR
LAWYERS AND JUDGES 15-88 (1982); A. Leo Levin & Deirdre Golash, Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution, an Overview, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1985).
13. See William E. Craco, Note, Compelling Alternatives: The Authority of Federal Judges to
Order Summary Jury Trial Participation, 57 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 483, 494-95 (1988). Conflict
exists as to whether SIT is designed to foster settlement by ensuring that settlement negotiations are
based on a realistic expectation of the litigants' chances of success at trial or whether SIT is itself
settlement negotiations. See United States v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 124 F.R.D. 146, 153 n.7
(E.D. Ky. 1989); cf. Craco, supra. The author believes this distinction is merely semantic. The
determination depends on the outcome of the SIT. If the parties accept the jury's verdict, the SIT
is a settlement negotiation. If the parties settle independently, or fail to settle after the SIT, it is a
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counsel present abbreviated versions of their cases to the jury. 4 After
considering the arguments and evidence presented, the jury returns a nonbinding
verdict.' 5 The SJT brings litigants closer together-in terms of the value of the
claims-so that they can then engage in meaningful settlement negotiations.'
6
If, following SJT, negotiations do not result in settlement, the parties proceed
to a full de novo trial.
17
In 1980, Federal Judge Thomas D. Lambros, of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio, created SJT'5 in a products liability claim.' 9
Summary jury trial is often perceived as only being effective for single party
actions' involving basic theories for recovery, such as negligence.2'
However, SJT is successfully used in multi-party actions involving complex
legal issues, such as toxic torts.' Parties have used SJT to settle actions
involving a variety of legal theories, including products liability, toxic tort,
negligence, contract, personal injury, age, gender and race discrimination,
admiralty, and antitrust.'
device to foster settlement.
14. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text (discussing the SJT proceeding).
15. See infra note 61.
16. See supra note 13 (discussing the purpose of SJT).
17. See infra note 99. Judge Lambros hoped that SIT would provide an alternative to the
drastic measures proposed to decrease federal court backlog. See supra note 8. Instead of
eliminating the participation of the general public in the judicial process, SJT allows the lay public
to participate while providing federal courts with a means to accommodate diversity cases. Lambros
& Shunk, supra note 8, at 45. See Judicial Conference of the Sixth Circuit of the United States, The
Summary Jury Trial, May 16, 1985, app. C at 7 [hereinafter 6th Circuit Conference] (arguing that
if alternatives such as SJT are not adopted, the right to a jury trial will be lost as courts become so
inundated with trial backlog that it becomes impossible to dispose of cases). But see Posner, supra
note 3, at 388 (arguing that SJT is unlikely to affect the settlement rate).
18. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 43 n.1.
19. JUDGE THOMAS D. LAMBROS, THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE
METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A REP. TO THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES
COMM. ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984) [hereinafter SJT
REPORT].
20. M. DANIEL JACOUBOVITCH & CARL M. MOORE, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 32 (Federal Judicial Center 1982) (recommending that a narrow
profile of cases suitable to SJT treatment be formulated and suggesting that only
single-plaintiff/single-defendant cases be included in the profile despite the partial success of SJT in
multiparty actions); cf. 6th Circuit Conference, supra note 17, at 14-19, app. A addendum I
(reporting that SIT has been successful in multiparty asbestos cases).
21. See SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 463 (reasoning that uncertainty of how a jury perceives
damages often arises in cases involving a "reasonable" standard, such as in personal injury and
negligence cases).
22. See infra note 30 (discussing the groundwater contamination case over which Judge Ensler
presided). See generally 6th Circuit Conference, supra note 17, at app. A, addendum I (discussing
Judge Lambros' success in conducting SJT in asbestos cases in clusters of 10 cases per SJT).
23. See SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 472.
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Flexibility is the key factor for selecting cases for SJT.' One purpose of
SJT is to dispose of potentially lengthy' cases that should settle, but do not
because the litigants fail to objectively consider the strengths and weaknesses of
their cases.' Generally, SJT is used when the litigants' refusal to settle is
based on differing expectations of jury evaluation of the evidence. 7 Because
a jury hears, evaluates, and actually returns a verdict based on evidence
presented at the SJT, the process can provide insight into the decision of a jury
24. JACOUBOVITCH & MOORE, supra note 20, at 3. No solid criteria exist for selecting cases
for SIT. Judge Lambros has stated that SIT is suitable for any case in which a jury trial has been
requested, discovery has been completed, and all other pretrial procedures have been exhausted.
Id. Another commentator has stated that there is no pattern of cases best suited for SIT, but SIT
is used whenever the judge believes a jury's verdict would prompt resolution. Hugh W. Brenneman,
Jr. & Edward Wesoloski, Blueprint for a Summary Jury Trial, MICH. B. J., Sept. 1986, at 888
[hereinafter Blueprint]. Judge Enslen, of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Michigan, uses three criteria for selecting cases for SIT: 1) similar competence level of attorneys
for both sides, 2) genuine dispute as to the monetary value of the case, and 3) a day in court might
be cathartic for the parties. Clifford J. Zatz, Toxic Tort Case Unlikely to Have Settled Without
Summary Jury Trial, Lawyer Says, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND
PERSPECTIVES 107, 108 (Martha A. Matthews ed., 1990) [hereinafter Zatz]. These three different
approaches evidence the discretion judges have in determining which cases are suitable for SJT.
25. See infra note 29. "Most agree .. . that summary jury trials should be reserved for cases
that are likely to take more than a few days to try." D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENTSTRATEGIES
FOR FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 15 (Federal Judicial Center 1986) [hereinafter SETTLEMENT
STRATEGIES]; see Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 334 (S.D. I1l.) (noting that a five
to six-week trial was scheduled for a two-day SJT), vacated 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987); McKay
v. Ashland Oil Co., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (noting that a six-week trial was scheduled for
a five-day SJIT); "Courts typically convene summary jury trials where there has been a jury demand
in a protracted case which relies heavily on circumstantial evidence as opposed to those cases where
the credibility of witnesses is paramount." Nina J. Spiegel, Mandatory Summary Jury Trial in
Federal Court: Foundationally Flawed, 16 PEPP. L. REv. S251, S255 (1989).
26. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 46 (reasoning that where recovery hinges on jurors'
perception as to liability and damages, SIT is valuable because it will provide a jury's perception
as to the outcome without affecting the parties' right to a full trial). David Ranil, Summary Jury
Trials Gain Favor.: New Spurs to Settlement, NAT'L L.J., June 10, 1985, at 1. A major impediment
to out-of-court settlements is that attorneys and their clients are unable to realistically assess the
value of their cases. Id. Many times lawyers cannot assess the fair settlement value of a case
because they lose their objectivity. Their evaluations are often based on hopes and expectations
rather than on the actual strengths and weaknesses of their cases. Id. Another reason why cases
fail to settle is that opposing sides are unwilling to discuss settlement. See John H. Wilkinson, ADR
is Increasingly Effective, Averts Litigation in Many Cases, NAT'L L.J., April 4, 1988, at 22
(explaining that a case that was believed by both sides to be unsettleable was settled because the SJT
compelled participants to communicate).
27. SIT REPORT, supra note 19, at 463. "If only parties could gaze into a crystal ball and be
able to predict, with a reasonable amount of certainty, what a jury would do in their respective
cases, the parties and counsel would be more willing to reach a settlement rather than going through
the expense and aggravation of a full trial." Id. (emphasis in original).
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and thereby promote settlement negotiations.' Settling these potentially
lengthy cases allows more efficient adjudication of the remaining docket.39
Many judges who have employed SJT agree that it conserves a significant
amount of both the court's time and resources. 30
The parties' voluntary use of SJT as a settlement device is well accepted by
both judges and commentators.31 Concerns remain, however," about judicial
28. SIT weakens the optimism that parties feel about their cases by providing the parties with
more information prior to trial. See Charles F. Webber, Mandatory Summary Jury Trial: Playing
By the Rules?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1495, 1496 (1989); SIT leads to settlements that satisfy both
parties by making both sides aware of the strengths and weaknesses of their case. See Craco, supra
note 13, at 488.
29. "When courts provide consensual alternatives for certain categories of disputes, they reduce
the length of conflicts, prevent unnecessary adjudication, and hasten disposition of other cases that
require adversarial resolution." Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines
for Ensuring Fair and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1093 (1990). "By avoiding
trial, mandatory mediation and SIT make more time available for cases that most merit consideration
by traditional courts, such as those that involve constitutional issues or important new issues of law."
Id. at n.55. See, e.g., Hon. Richard A. Enslen, Federal Judge Says Summary Jury Trial Can Help
Settlement in Toxic Tort Cases, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: PRACTICE AND
PERSPECTIVES 105 (Martha A. Matthews ed., 1990) (A "gigantic' groundwater contamination case
settled for $3.5 million after a three-day SIT. It was estimated that a full trial would have taken
9-14 months. Prior to the SIT, defendants had over 60 witnesses, had 2 full-time attorneys, and had
spent $2.5 million on discovery). Questions remain as to whether SIT actually reduces the number
of cases tried. See Posner, supra note 3, at 388-89 (arguing that SIT is not likely to affect the
settlement rate). If SIT settles some cases that otherwise would be tried, other cases will advance
on the docket, judges will put less pressure on those parties to settle, and refer fewer cases to
magistrates. There still will be the same number of trials. Id. But cf 6th Circuit Conference,
supra note 17, app. C at 299 (stating that SIT settled a 10-year-old Daiflon antitrust case that had
gone through a full trial, had been to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals twice, and had been to the
United States Supreme Court once). SIT makes it less time-consuming for parties in potentially
protracted cases to reach the courthouse doors. 6th Circuit Conference, supra note 17, app. C at
2 (implementing the SIT procedure increased the settlement rate in the Western District of Oklahoma
from 84% to 96% and decreased the time from filing to disposition from six-months to five-months,
during a period in which filings had doubled).
30. Honorable Arthur Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 829, 834 (1986)
(eight summary jury trials saved 102 trial days of a 200 trial day year); District Judge Bertelsman
.used the time saved to work six days a week instead of seven for awhile, perhaps saving [him]
from a heart attack." McKay v. Ashland Oil Co., 120 F.R.D. 43, 49 n.19 (E.D. Ky. 1988); SIT
REPORT, supra note 19 at 500-09 apps. G-J (letters explaining judges' successful experiences with
SIT).
31. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that mandatory SJT
is inappropriate, but if engaged in with the consent of both parties, it is authorized); Bobby M.
Harges, The Promise of the Mandatory Summary Jury Trial, 63 TEMP. L.Q. 799, 815 (1990) (stating
that courts have authority to convene consensual SIT). But cf Posner, supra note 3, at 835 (stating
that he is uncertain Congress has authorized SIT).
32. See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 105-
170 and accompanying text.
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authority to mandate participation in SJT.33 While no express statutory
authority compels participation in SJT, proponents of the procedure argue that
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, 3 read in light of Rule 1,' provides the
authority to mandate SJT participation. 6 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit has found no express or implicit statutory authority for judges to mandate
SJT.37
Concern also remains about judicial authority to impanel jurors for SJT.3
Judge Battisti, of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, for
example, finds no authority to use jurors from the regular jury pool as summary
jurors and holds that the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 does not
authorize this practice. 39  Proponents of SJT argue that the summary jury is
similar to the advisory jury provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
33. See generally, Posner, supra note 3, at 385-86 (reasoning that the 1983 amendments
authorize the discussion-notimplementation-at the pretrial conferences of extrajudicial procedures
and arguing that SIT is not an extrajudicial procedure); Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., The Furure of
Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
455, 471-72 (1988) (arguing that Rule 16 is intended to be noncoercive and, to the extent that
mandatory SIT interferes with a party's determination of settlement techniques, a court exceeds the
scope of its case management power under Rule 16); N. Spiegel, supra note 25, at S259 (arguing
that SIT is not a conference within the meaning of Rule 16, but a procedure far more intrusive than
a conference because it requires parties to reveal their trial strategy); Webber, supra note 28, at
1495 (reasoning that because one party will use the SJT verdict to put a monetary value on the
action, the SJT is more than a discussion about settlement negotiations, the SIT is itself a settlement
negotiation beyond the scope of Rule 16).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(1) and (5); (c)(7) and (11) state in pertinent part:
(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may in its discretion direct
the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a
conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition
of the action; . . . (5) facilitating the settlement of the case ...
(c) Subjects to Be Discussed at Pretrial Conferences. The participants at any conference
under this rule may consider and take action with respect to . . . (7) the possibility of
settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute; . . . (I1) [or]
such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
35. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see supra note 1.
36. Judge Lambros initially relied on Rule 16(a)(l) and (5), read in light of Rule 1, and on the
court's inherent power to manage and control its docket for authorization to conduct SIT. Lambros
& Shunk, supra note 8, at 51 (asserting that although not expressly authorized by the rules, SIT is
squarely grounded in the rules both technically and in spirit). After the 1983 amendments to Rule
16, proponents for SIT based the judge's authority to compel participation in SIT on Rule 16(c)(7)
and (11). SIT REPORT, supra note 19, at 469. Judge Lambros recognized that Rule 16(c)(7) and
(11) merely recommended that settlement be discussed, suggesting that while Rule 16 might
authorize consensual use of SJT, it did not provide for its mandatory use. Id.
37. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that there is no
legislative authority for mandatory SMT.
38. Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
39. Id. at 508; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 1966 & Supp. 1991); see infra notes 156-58.
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39(c).' This is a poor analogy, however, given the history and spirit of that
rule. 4' Because SJT utilizes a judge and jury, it resembles an actual trial and
therefore gives the parties confidence and faith that their case is being tried
fairly and impartially, and that the verdict is similar to one they would receive
at a full trial.42 The presence of the jury distinguishes SJT from other forms
of ADR, and thus express statutory authority to impanel a jury for SJT is
necessary.
This Note argues that federal judges currently lack express statutory
authority to impanel jurors for voluntary SJT proceedings. Part II of this Note
discusses the development of the SJT procedure by focusing on Judge Lambros'
model for SJT.43 Part III addresses the current status of SJT by considering
the decisions of Strandell v. Jackson Count.)l5 and McKay v. Ashland Oil,
Inc.' These cases best illustrate the split between the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits on whether judges can mandate the use of SJT. Part III also discusses
whether courts have legislative authority to impanel jurors for SJT and concludes
that federal judges lack express authority to do so. 47  Part IV compares the
advantages and disadvantages in the use of regular jurorse for SJT.49
Finally, Part V asserts that employing regular jurors as summary jurors is a
permissible method when invoking a voluntary SJT procedure, but that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be amended to provide express
authority for impanelling SJT jurors in a voluntary SJT.
40. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 52 (stating that the idea behind SJT is similar to an
advisory jury); Thomas D. Lambros, 7he Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 VILL.
L. REV. 1363, 1367 (1984) [hereinafter Judge's Role] (stating that the concept of SJT is analogous
to the advisory jury proceeding that is authorized by Rule 39(c)).
41. See infra notes 187-93 (discussing the origin in equity of Rule 39(c)).
42. Judge's Role, supra note 40, at 1367 (arguing that because SJT resembles a full trial, it is
a successful means of dispute resolution, given the public's continued confidence in the judiciary).
43. See infra notes 50-104 and accompanying text (discussing the development of SJT and its
variant forms).
44. See infra notes 108-52 and accompanying text (discussing the current status of SJT in
federal courts).
45. 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Ill.), vacated, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
46. 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (stating that the court finds itself in respectful disagreement
with the 7th Circuit on inherent powers and Federal Rules allowing for mandatory SJT).
47. See infra notes 155-97 and accompanying text (discussing the theories advanced for
impanelling SJT jurors).
48. Throughout this note, the term 'regular juror' will be used to indicate a petit juror selected
to serve on a jury for a full jury trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 1966 & Supp. 1991).
49. See infra notes 198-223 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of SJT in general and the use of regular jurors for SJT).
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUMMARY JURY TRIAL
The summary jury trial was developed in 1980 by Judge Thomas D.
Lambros for the Northern District of Ohio,' after he presided over two cases
that he felt should have been settled rather than tried.5 Summary jury trial
was first used in a products liability case concerning a defective football
helmet. 2 In that case, the court held an SJT after other pretrial procedures
had failed to produce a settlement. 53  When the court finally used SJT, the
parties settled the case without a costly and lengthy trial .'
According to Judge Lambros' model,55 SJT is a half-day procedure56 in
which counsel for each side, with the parties present,57 each have one hour'
50. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 43 n.1.
51. SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 463 (explaining that Judge Lambros conceived the SIT idea
while trying a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) case and a diversity automobile accident
case, both of which he thought should have settled prior to trial but did not because the parties for
both sides thought they could obtain a more favorable resolution from a jury than from their pretrial
settlement negotiations).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (stating that the SIT was held only after all possible pretrial settlement techniques had
failed and explaining that SJT is to be used as the final alternative before a full trial).
55. For the purposes of this note, Judge Lambros' model will be used to discuss the process
because it is the general model from which other jurisdictions have made modifications.
56. Jurisdictions using the SJT procedure differ on how long the presentations will last.
According to Judge Lambros' model, an SIT lasts one-half day. SIT REPORT, supra note 19, at
469. In the Western District of Michigan, judges are committed to allowing the attorneys one hour
each to present their cases.
Attorneys often feel that one hour is not enough time to present a case in its entirety.
The economical use of our time is a necessity, however, if we are to comfortably
complete the entire procedure, including the jury's deliberations, within a single day.
There really are few cases, properly organized, that cannot be summarized in 60
minutes.
Blueprint, supra note 24, at 891. But in 1990, the average SIT lasted one to two days. Anne C.
Morgan, Thwarting Judicial Power to Order Summary Jury Trials in Federal District Courts:
Strandell v. Jackson County, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 491, 494 (1990). Even in the Western
District of Michigan, the procedure has been modified to provide for longer presentations. Judge
Enslen conducted an SIT in a groundwater contamination case that lasted three days. Enslen, supra
note 29, at 105. One of the attorneys that participated in the groundwatercontamination SIT, while
finding the procedure advantageous, suggested that the SIT procedure should be extended to four
to five days. Zatz, supra note 24, at 112.
57. SIT REPORT, supra note 19, at 470 (explaining that because SIT is performed for its effect
on the litigants, clients are expected to attend the SIT unless they have previously sought leave of
court excusing them from attendance). Most judges conducting SJTs require that the parties be
present for the SJT. The presence of the parties is so important to one judge that his court has gone
so far as to issue "writs of habeas corpus to obtain the presence of plaintiffs confined in institutions
.. Blueprint, supra note 24, at 489-90. In one instance, the defendant was a Norwegian cruise
ship line, and the settlement had to be personally approved by the dompany's director; at the court's
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to present their cases59 to a six-person jury.' The SJT verdict is nonbinding
unless the parties agree to be bound by the verdict.6 The use of an impartial
jury enables litigants to feel confident that their rights have been vindicated by
an SJT proceeding.62 Although counsel may not call witnesses, 63 they may
explain the expected testimony of the witnesses to the jurors.' Counsel may
also produce exhibits.' Because the SJT is less formal than a full trial, neither
the rules of evidence nor the rules of procedure apply.' Also, because of time
direction, a director flew from Europe to attend the SJT. Id. But cf. N. Spiegel, supra note 25,
at S251 n.17 (asserting that defects in a case are easy to determine without the aid of adversaries).
58. See supra note 29. Depending on the complexity of the case, some judges allow for longer
presentations. See, e.g., Enslen, supra note 29, at 105 (discussing a groundwater contamination
case in which the plaintiff was allowed a six-hour presentation and defendant was allowed a
five-hour presentation).
59. Generally, during the SJT proceeding, only the attorney is allowed to make the presentation,
but Judge Enslen allows the parties or expert witnesses to speak to the jury at the attorney's
discretion. SIT, "Mediation, "and Mini-Trials in Federal Court: An Interview with Judge Richard
A. Enslen, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG., Oct. 1984, at 6 [hereinafter Interview].
60. The number of jurors used in SJT has also been modified. Judge John McNaught, U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, uses a five-person jury to assure that the jury will
not return a tie verdict. Judge Lucius Bunton, of the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Texas, reported using a three-personjury. SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at 73 n.184.
Judge Lambros has used multiple jury panels in asbestos SJTs. Id. at 70 n.174; 6th Circuit
Conference, supra note 17, app. A addendum I at 5 (explaining that Judge Lambros used two jury
panels to ascertain areas of consistency in the verdicts and to determine whether asbestos cases
would follow a particular pattern). Judge Enslen used two panels of six jurors in the groundwater
contamination SJT. Enslen, supra note 29, at 105.
61. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 43 (stating that the parties may agree in advance to be
bound by a unanimous verdict; otherwise, the verdict is purely advisory).
62. N. Spiegel, supra note 25, at S254.
63. Craco, supra note 13, at 487 (explaining that the exclusion of live witnesses saves time).
Without live witnesses, no cross-examination occurs, which may pose serious problems in
determining credibility. See infra notes 175-79 and accompanying text. But see infra note 117
(stating that a scheduled SIT allowed for a limited number of live witnesses). One SJT, in which
witness credibility was an issue, attempted to alleviate the problem by allowing the parties to present
videotape testimony. See Enslen, suprd note 29, at 105; for a discussion of the preparation and
contents of the parties' videotapes, see Zatz, supra note 24, at 108-09.
64. The attorney may read depositions, read affidavits, or tell the summary jury that he has
spoken to the witness to ascertain the witness' teptimony. SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 471; see
also A. Spiegel, supra note 30, at 831 (explaining that attorneys may read from depositions,
interrogatories, or other documentary evidence, but that no testimony may be mentioned unless the
reference is based on discovery or a sworn statement).
65. SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 483 (explaining that because evidentiary and procedural
rules are few and flexible, attorneys are free to adduce exhibits for the jury).
66. Id. (reasoning that because the SJT is nonbinding, there is no need for strict evidentiary or
procedural rules).
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constraints, objections are discouraged.67
The case must be substantially ready for trial before the judge conducts an
SJT.' The parties should have completed discovery and the judge should have
heard all motions prior to the proceeding.' Not later than three days before
the scheduled SJT, counsel for both parties must submit trial briefs and proposed
jury instructions.'
On the day of the SJT, a jury panel of ten members is selected from the
regular jury pool.7 The judge gives potential jurors a brief description of the
nature of the case, the parties, and the attorneys.' The potential jurors fill out
short questionnaires that the judge and counsel then use during voir dire.' The
67. Id. at 470-71. "Although the court discourages objections during the proceeding, it will
entertain an objection if counsel oversteps the bounds of propriety." Robert Y. Gwin, Summary
Jury Trial: An Explanation and Analysis, 52 Ky. BENCH & B. 16, 17 (1988); cf Interview, supra
note 59, at 6 (explaining that Judge Enslen does not allow objections but tells the attorneys that if
they make false or misleading factual representations to the jury, he will give the nonoffending party
an extra 10 minutes at the end of the presentation to explain to the jury how they were misled by
the lawyer's false factual representation).
68. SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 470 (reasoning that for SJT to be a truly successful and
realistic prediction of the outcome of the case, "[d]iseovery must be complete and there must be no
motions pending").
69. Magistrate Brenneman has the parties themselves determine what evidence will be allowed
at the SIT so that the parties will be confident that the verdict is reliable. His experience reveals
that most evidentiary disputes are settled by the parties so that the need for evidentiary pre-trial
motions is slight. Blueprint, supra note 24, at 888-89.
We urge both sides to let their opponents "have their best shot" when deciding whether
to allow evidence, on the premise that at a SJT an attorney is not only selling the jury
on the merits of the case, but the other side as well. If the opponent does not feel that
there has been a fair hearing, it is likely that the SJT verdict will be given little
credence.
Id. at 889. If an evidentiary matter cannot be resolved by the parties, the judge will decide the issue
on a motion in limine. Id.
70. SFT REPORT, supra note 19, at 470.
71. Id. See DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES, supra note 10, at 3 (explaining that in conducting
an SJT, the judge impanels a jury from the regular jury trial pool to hear counsel present abbreviated
cases). Some courts separate the pool of summary jurors from the pool of regular jurors, but this
is done after jury selection. Interview, supra note 59, at 7; see also A. Spiegel, supra note 30, at
830 (stating that jurors who participated in SJT are separated from the regular jury wheel).
72. SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 470.
73. d. The juror profile contains information pertaining to the potential jurors' personal
knowledge of parties and attorneys in the case and any prejudicial attitudes that the potential jurors
might have about issues in the case. 6th Circuit Conference, supra note 17, app. D at 298; in
asbestos cases, the jurors fill out a more extensive questionnaire. Id. app. A addendum I at 5.
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judge then asks questions during voir dire7 4 that tend to indicate bias of
potential jurors.75 The proceeding allows counsel to exercise two peremptory
challenges76 each to the venire to reduce the panel to six jurors.'
Commentators disagree about whether potential jurors should be told of the
nonbinding nature of the SJT proceeding. According to Judge Lambros' model,
the judge tells the potential jurors about "the nature of the summary trial" with
an emphasis on "the difference between the summary trial and a trial on the
merits."' Most commonly, the jurors are not told about the nonbinding nature
of the SJT verdict until after they have already returned what they were led to
believe would be a binding verdict.' One commentator has expressed concern
that telling the jurors of the nonbinding nature of SJT will lead jurors to decide
the case less carefully and thus compromise public confidence in the legal
74. Voir dire for SJT is an informal "show of hands" type voir dire that rarely lasts more than
fifteen minutes. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 47 n.20. This procedure can be modified
depending on the nature of the case. Judge Enslen presided over a groundwater SJT that had a more
extensive voir dire that lasted three to four hours. Enslen, supra note 29, at 105; see also 6th
Circuit Conference, supra note 17, app. A addendum I at 5 (explaining that voir dire in asbestos
cases was conducted like voir dire in a full trial).
75. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 48 (explaining that jurors signaling affirmative to
certain questions, such as whether they have ever been in an automobile accident, will be questioned
more closely to determine possible bias in an automobile accident case).
76. A. Spiegel, supra note 30, at 830; cf. 6th Circuit Conference, supra note 17, app. A
addendum I at 5 (allowing for-cause challenges in asbestos cases).
77. A. Spiegel, supra note 30, at 830. But see supra note 60.
78. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 47. Although jurors are told the difference between
the procedures, they are not told that their verdict is not binding on the parties. The jurors are also
not told that they are in no way obligated to serve on the summary jury. The judge does not tell
the jury that this is not a normal trial. The jurors are led to believe that they are performing regular
jury service. 6th Circuit Conference, supra note 17, app. D at 298.
79. The practice regarding when, if ever, the jury is told its true function is not uniform. See
Posner, supra note 3, at 386-87 (describing various methods district courts use to inform jurors of
the nonbinding nature of their decisions and the potential problems this might create). "Most courts
wait until after the jury reaches a verdict before informing them that their decision is non-binding.
Many judges believe that the jury may not deliberate as diligently if they know they will render a
non-binding verdict." Gwin, supra note 67, at 16. The Western District of Michigan also has
decided not to tell the jurors of the nonbinding nature of the verdict until after thejury has returned.
One of the more difficult decisions we have made is in waiting until the verdict is
returned to tell the jurors that the SJT is a non-binding procedure. Consequently, the
jurors assume their verdict is final. While we have felt somewhat uncomfortable in not
being totally candid with this experimental approach, both the attorneys and jurors have
told us they approve of it.
Blueprint, supra note 24, at 890. But cf. A. Spiegel, supra note 30, at 830 (stating that Judge
Spiegel's court follows the formalities of an actual trial to impress upon the jury the importance of
the proceedings, but does not mislead the jury into believing that they are participating in a regular
jury trial). Cf. Recent Development-Procedure: Summary Jury Trials in United States District
Court, Western District of Oklahoma, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 214, 217 (1984) (stating that jurors are not
informed that their verdict is nonbinding).'
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system.8s
Once the jury panel has been selected, the attorneys present their
abbreviated cases,"t bringing forward the evidence most likely to be admitted
at trial.' Actual presentation of the abbreviated cases resembles closing
arguments.83 The attorneys combine factual representations with conjecture,
argument, and persuasion. s4 No court reporter is present unless the parties
have arranged for one."3
At the close of the arguments, the judge verbally instructs the jury about
both the law" and the proper completion of the verdict sheet." The jury does
80. Posner, supra note 3, at 386 (expressing concern that the nonbinding nature of the SJT
verdict will decrease incentives for jurors to perform well); see Hume v. M & C Management, 129
F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990); see infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 54-66. The time allotted each attorney can be divided to allow for rebuttal
and closing arguments. SJIT REPORT, supra note 19, at 471.
82. SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 471 (explaining that although the rules of evidence do not
apply to SJTs, factual representations must be based on discoverable materials such as depositions,
documents, affidavits, etc); Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 49. The first SJTs had no
evidentiary rules, but it became apparent that attorneys could easily abuse this freedom by inventing
or misrepresenting facts to bolster their argument. In later SJTs, facts represented by attorneys must
have a basis in a product of discovery or in an affidavit.
83. Blueprint, supra note 24, at 891 (explaining that presentations are in the form of closing
arguments with attorneys free to blend evidence and argument). But cf. A. Spiegel, supra note 30,
at 831. Judge Spiegel conducts his SJT in the form of an actual trial. Counsel make brief opening
statements; then each side is afforded the opportunity to present its respective case. During this
presentation, the attorneys may not characterize or interpret the evidence. Each side is then given
time for closing arguments. At closing arguments, counsel are allowed to characterize the evidence
and argue inferences to be drawn. Id. Chief Judge James Battin, of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Montana, divides the SJT proceeding into opening statements, cases-in-chief, and closing
arguments. The parties may divide their allotted time between the three trial segments as they
choose. 6th Circuit Conference, supra note 17, at 16.
84. Gwin, supra note 67, at 17. The procedure has been described by one judge as "a trial
lawyer's dream": "He doesn't have to worry about responses from witnesses; he is essentially doing
a peroration to the jury without any hindrance whatsoever. He can argue in any fashion he wants
to. He is not bound by any rules of evidence. There are no objections going on." SETTLEMENT
STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at 73 (quoting Judge Enslen).
85. Gwin, supra note 67, at 17.
86. In one district, the attorneys are required to furnish a joint set of short, substantive jury
instructions 10 days before the scheduled SJT, which the court edits and adds to its own instructions.
Each side is then given a set of these instructions on the day of the SJT. Blueprint, supra note 24,
at 892.
87. SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 471. For examples of the verdict sheets used in the
Northern District of Ohio, see id. app. D at 492. While most judges have only the jurors deliberate
as to liability and damages, Judge Enslen has the law clerk, court recorder, and anyone else present
in the courtroom vote by secret ballot. He has found this to be very effective when all six jurors
and everyone in the courtroom voted the same. Interview, supra note 59, at 7.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 [1993], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss2/6
1993] SUMMARY JURY TRIALS 473
not receive written instructions.s While the jury is deliberating, judges in one
federal court explain to the litigants that "six disinterested strangers are about
to decide their case, and should the case go to a full-scale de novo trial, six
other such strangers would do the same thing.'
The jury may return a consensus verdict, or, if a consensus cannot be
reached, the jurors may return individual verdicts as to liability and damages.'
When the jury has returned its verdict or verdicts, the parties and attorneys have
the opportunity to question jurors about their decisions.9 ' At the conclusion of
the SJT proceeding, the parties once again attempt to negotiate a settlement.
Some jurisdictions require a settlement conference immediately after the SJT
proceeding.' Other jurisdictions require the parties to wait a short period of
time before continuing negotiations.'
The SJT procedure is to be used in cases where the main obstacle to a
pretrial settlement is the difference in the case's predicted outcome. Summary
jury trial is designed to settle actions that should settle when none of the other
pretrial settlement techniques are successful." Generally, potential SJT cases
88. Blueprint, supra note 24, at 892 (reasoning that it is unnecessary to furnish written
instructions for the jurors in an abbreviated trial setting).
89. Id. at 889. This court seems to be too coercive in its attempts to persuade the parties to
settle. The court further asks the parties: "Is there any reason to believe . . . that the jurors at a
second trial would return a substantially different verdict than the jurors at the SJT?" Id.
90. SIT Report, supra note 19, at 471 (asserting that consensus verdicts are encouraged, but
where a consensus cannot be reached, individual verdicts afford counsel substantial insight into the
juror's individual perceptions and may suggest a basis for reasonable settlement). But cf. Blueprint,
supra note 24, at 892 (requiring a unanimous verdict). There is a provision that if the jurors do not
return a unanimous verdict within a reasonable time, they are allowed to return individual verdicts,
but the summary jurors are not told this, and it has never been necessary for the court to use this
provision. Id. It is estimated that a split verdict occurs in approximately 10% of SJTs. Ranil,
supra note 26, at 1.
91. See Interview, supra note 59, at 7 (Judge Enslen leaves the courtroom and allows the jurors
to speak with the lawyers and parties and to give their analysis of the case and the tactics used by
the lawyers in the courtroom); DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEvIcES, supra note 10, at 43 (Lawyers may
question the jury about the verdict and the deliberations); Enslen, supra note 29, at 105 (During the
post-SJT interview with the attorneys, jurors were not at all intimidated and actually verbally scolded
certain parties and attorneys); Blueprint, supra note 24, at 892 (Jurors are asked what arguments
were effective and answer hypothetical questions. The questioning reveals much about the jury's
decision-making process and allows each side a greater understanding of the case's further potential).
92. Blueprint, supra note 24, at 892.
93. Judge Lambros does not hold a settlement conference immediately after the SJT and allows
a few weeks for negotiation before a full trial. SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at 75.
94. See Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 45-46, which states that courts, attorneys, and
litigants feel frustrated over the need to try a case that neither side wishes to litigate and would be
willing to settle if only the jury's perception of the case could be obtained. In these instances, the
attorney's legal training is a disadvantage because knowledge of the law precludes an ability to see
the case as a lay jury would. Id. 6th Circuit Conference, supra note 17, app. D at 298 (reasoning
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fail to settle because the attorneys and the litigants cannot objectively evaluate
the strengths and weaknesses of their cases and thus demand their day in
court.95 Summary jury trial provides litigants with an abbreviated "day in
court" that enables the litigants to predict how jurors will decide the issues of
liability and damages." The parties, armed with this knowledge,' may then
negotiate a realistic settlement, thereby avoiding the time and expense of
litigation." If SJT fails to produce a settlement, the parties may then litigate
their action.'
Federal and state court judges quickly adopted and occasionally
modifiedi"° the SJT procedure. By 1984, Judge Lambros reported that ten
districts other than the Northern District of Ohio were using SJT as a final
pretrial settlement method.'' Although a lack of reporting makes a
that when the parties disagree as to liability and damages, the clients' posture during settlement
negotiation is often based on their lawyers' analysis of similar cases, which may be of little value).
95. Judge Lambros has stated:
Absent the opportunity to hear both sides of the case presented to the finders of fact, a
lawyer and his client may be unable to objectively recognize the weaknesses in their
position. The lawyer and his client may believe they can "pull off" a weak case if only
they can get it in front of a jury. These reasons, among others, act as barriers to
settlement; barriers which often result in protracted litigation and expense.
SIT REPORT, supra note 19, at 468.
96. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing jury verdicts); See also Zatz,
supra note 24, at 111 (explaining that after a jury came back with a verdict for the defendant, the
judge asked the jurors to deliberate further and return a damage figure that assumed they had found
for the plaintiff).
97. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text. But cf. Jack L. Watson, The Settlement
Theory of Discovery, 55 ILL. B.J. 480, 489-90 (1967) (arguing that the greatest factor in settlement
is the unknown).
98. SIT REPORT, supra note 19, at 468 (commenting that when confronted with opposing
counsel's arguments, the lawyer and the client can more objectively evaluate the weaknesses of their
case). But cf. N. Spiegel, supra note 25, at S254 n.20 (noting that by solidifying issues and
exposing parties' strategies, SJT may actually encourage litigation).
99. SIT does not affect the parties' right to a trial de novo, thus avoiding potential Seventh
Amendment problems. The SJT jury decision is strictly advisory. Neither the jury findings nor any
statement made by counsel during the SIT is admissible at a trial on the merits or may be used as
judicial admissions. A. Spiegel, supra note 30, at 831.
100. See supra notes 56-93 (discussing variation of Judge Lambros' SJT model); cf. Interview,
supra note 59, at 4 (stating that variations in Judge Enslen's SIT procedures evolved out of necessity
from the types of cases in which he was employing SIT); DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES, supra note
10, at 3 (extolling the dynamic way in which SIT is being used. Various types of SIT are being
used by the same court and even by the same judge).
101. SIT REPORT, supra note 19, at 474-75. It is difficult to determine exactly how many
districts have employed SIT because of the lack of reporting. It is estimated that at least 65 federal
judges have employed the procedure. Paul Marcotte, Summary Jury Trials Touted, A.B.A. J., Apr.
1, 1987, at 27.
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determination of the number of courts currently using SJT difficult,r 2 at least
100 state and federal judges have tried the procedure." Not only are district
courts using SJT, but several district courts have followed the lead of the
Northern District of Ohio and have adopted local SJT nrues.'°
III. THE CURRENT STATUS OF SUMMARY JURY TRIALS
While the use of SJT has increased dramatically since its introduction in
1980, '05 the procedure has generated a considerable amount of debate both for
and against its use."0 6 One point of contention between SJTs proponents and
its opponents is whether judges have the authority to mandate unwilling litigants
to participate in SJT. Another point of contention is whether summary jurors
can be selected from the regular juror wheel. This Section discusses the court
decisions on mandatory SJT and the court decisions concerning impanelling an
SJT jury.
A. The Mandatory Summary Jury Trial Debate
The controversy over the authority ofjudges to compel participation in SJT
proceedings was sparked by the Strandell v. Jackson Count2° and McKay v.
Ashland Oil, Inc.'0 8 decisions. In Strandell, the district court held the
plaintiff's attorney in criminal contempt for failing to participate in a mandatory
102. Because SIT is a pretrial settlement procedure, not to be used as a trial if settlement is not
reached, it is not recorded. Therefore, there are few cases documenting its use. Also, to date, there
has been no comprehensive study conducted on the procedure.
103. In 1989, Judge Lambros estimated that SIT had been employed by at least 100 judges
across the country. Thomas D. Lambros, 7he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:A New Adversarial
Model for a New Era, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 802 (1989). Professor A. Leo Levin has
commented on the popularity of SIT, finding its success particularly remarkable because the
widespread use of SJT came about as a result of its adoption by individual judges rather than through
the promulgation of local rules. DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES, supra note 10, at 3.
104. See, e.g., N.D. INDIANA RULE 32 (West 1993); JOINT Loc. RULES OF THE EASTERN AND
WESTERN DIST. OF KENTUCKY L.R. 23 (West 1993); W.D. MICH. Civ. R. 44 (West 1993);
MONTANA STANDING ORDER 6A (D. Mont. 1983), reprinted in 103 F.R.D. 461 at 496; N.
DISTRICT OF OHIO Loc. RULE 7:5.1-5.3 (West 1993); W. D. OKLA. Loc. RULE 17Q) (West 1993);
E. D. PENN. Loc. RULE 8 (West 1992); MIDDLE DIST. PENN. LOC. RULE 513 (West 1992).
105. See supra note 81.
106. See supra note 33; cf. Harges, supra note 31 (analyzing SJT procedure and determining
that SJT is an effective ADR device and that federal judges should increase its effectiveness by
compelling parties to participate); Craco, supra note 13 (arguing that mandatory SIT is within the
authority vested in federal courts by statute and by inherent judicial power).
107. 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Ill. 1987) (holding plaintiff's attorney in contempt for refusing to
participate in court ordered ST), vacated. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987) (vacating the district court's
contempt judgment, holding that Rule 16 does not authorize compelled participation in SIr).
108. 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (holding that mandatory SIT is authorized by local rule
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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SJT. " The Seventh Circuit vacated the contempt judgment and held that the
judge had no legal authority to compel attorneys or litigants to participate in SJT
proceedings."' Several months after the Seventh Circuit decision was
announced, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky decided
.McKay. In adopting the reasoning of the Strandell district court decision, the
McKay court held that mandatory SJT is legislatively authorized,"' and the
court stated that it found itself in "respectful disagreement" with the Seventh
Circuit."1
2
1. Strandell v. Jackson County
In Strandell v. Jackson County, the plaintiffs brought a section 1983 civil
rights action against Jackson County, Illinois, alleging that the defendants
violated the decedent's constitutional rights because of the alleged
unconstitutional arrest, strip search, beating, and death of the decedent while in
custody in the county jail." 3 The trial judge, focusing on the length of time
a trial in the case would take, ordered the parties to participate in an SJT.114
The plaintiffs' counsel refused to participate in the SJT, arguing that he would
be required to reveal his trial strategy to the defendants, and that the court had
no authority to require him to participate in the procedure." 5 The court found
his arguments to be without merit and adjudged him to be in criminal contempt
109. Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 336 (S.D. I11. 1987).
110. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987).
111. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49.
112. Id. at 44 (stating that the court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit regarding the inherent
power and Federal Rules issues).
113. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 884; Maatman, supra note 33, at 468 (1988) (Mr. Maatman
represented the plaintiffs in Strandell and argued the case before the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit).
Judge Enslen believes that police cases are inappropriate for SIT. Interview, supra note 59,
at 9 (reasoning that for emotional reasons, lawsuits against police officers for brutality or prisoner
complaints within the county jail system are not amenable to SJT treatment). Under this rationale,
the Seventh Circuit Strandell opinion is correct.
114. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 334. The district court's findings in Strandell indicated that it
was an ideal case for SIT resolution. The estimated length of the trial was to be 20 to 25 days,
which would actually take at least five to six weeks. At the time of the final pretrial order, the
admissibility of over 300 exhibits had not yet been determined. The district court informed the
plaintiff's attorney that it did not have time available to try the case, nor would it have time for a
trial "in the foreseeable months ahead." Strandell, 838 F.2d at 885 (citing the trial transcript of
March 31, 1987, at 5).
The district court's resolution of Strandell focused on the length of time the trial would take,
but it did not discuss the facts of the case. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 334. The court of appeals,
however, focused on the facts and did not accept the inherent power argument. Strandell, 838 F.2d
at 888 (reasoning that a crowded docket does not permit a court to avoid adjudication of cases
properly within its congressionally mandated jurisdiction).
115. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 334.
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for failing to comply with the court's order to participate in jury selection for
the SJT." 6  The district court found authority to mandate SJT"7 in its
inherent power to manage and control its docket' and in Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 16(c)(7) and (11). "'
The Seventh Circuit, however, vacated the district court's contempt
judgment. It found no authority to compel unwilling litigants to participate in
SJT.I1 The court relied on the original draft of the resolution adopted in 1984
by the Judicial Conference of the United States, which "endorsed summary jury
trials 'with the voluntary consent of the parties.'" 2' Since the Seventh Circuit
Strandell decision, one commentator agreeing with that decision has argued that
116. Id. at 336 (reasoning that in modem litigation, full discovery leaves little surprise to
litigants as to what their opponent's theory of the case will be and relying on the 1984 Judicial
Conference Resolution endorsing experimental use of ST). The initial draft of the 1984 Judicial
Conference Resolution provided: "RESOLVED, the Judicial Conference endorses the use of
summary jury trial, only with the voluntary consent of the parties, as a potentially effective means
of promoting the fair and equitable settlement of lengthy civil jury trials." REP. OF JUDICIAL CONF.
COMM. ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM AGENDA 6-13, Sept. 1984, at 4. The final draft,
however, omitted the language regarding voluntary consent and stated: "RESOLVED, that the
Judicial Conference endorses the experimental use of summary jury trials as a potentially effective
way of promoting the fair and equitable settlement of potentially lengthy civil jury trials." REP. OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, Sept. 1984, at 88. But see
infra note 122 (arguing that the change in language did not change the meaning of the resolution).
Cf WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS
AND JUDGES 67 (1988) (stating that a disadvantage of SJT is that it forces counsel to disclose at least
some of their trial strategies).
117. The Strandell SIT was to be a modified SIT lasting one to two days with a limited number
of live witnesses. BRAZIL, supra note 116.
118. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962) (holding that sua sponte dismissal of
a case for failure to prosecute was authorized by the court's inherent power). Inherent power is
"governed not by rule or statute, but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own
affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases." Id. at 630-31. The
Strandell district court found that its obligation under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161
(1988), and the number of lengthy civil cases to be tried before the Strandell case-which itself was
to last five to six weeks-required the court to order the parties to participate in SIT. Strandell, 115
F.R.D. at 336 (citing statistics stating that as of March 1987, there were 80 criminal and 1,093 civil
cases pending in the district, which had only two judgeships in existence at that time).
119. Strandell, 115 F.R.D. at 335. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) and (11) provide that: "(c) the
participants of any conference under this rule may consider and take action with respect to ... (7)
the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute ... and (11)
such other matter as may aid in the disposition of the action."
120. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 1987) (interpreting the Rule 16
pretrial conference as being intended to foster settlement through the use of extrajudicial procedures,
but not intended to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked from the normal course of
litigation).
121. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 885. The lower court in Strandell relied on the final draft of the
resolution, which omitted the phrase "with the voluntary consent of the parties." Id. (quoting the
REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, Sept. 1984, at 88).
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even though the Judicial Conference Report excluded the term 'voluntary' from
its final draft of the resolution, the meaning of the resolution was
unchanged.-'-
The Seventh Circuit, relying heavily on language found in the advisory
committee notes to Rule 16,'23 found that Rule 16 does not authorize
mandatory participation in SJT." The court found that mandatory SJT was
inconsistent with the spirit of Rule 16 as articulated in Kothe v. Smith."5 In
Kothe, the court held that Rule 16 "was not designed as a means for clubbing
the parties-or one of them-into an involuntary compromise."" The Kothe
court, specifically addressing Rule 16(c)(7), stated that this rule was added in
the 1983 amendments to encourage pretrial settlement discussion, but was not
added to "impose settlement on unwilling litigants."27 The district court
relied on Rule 16(c)(7) as authority for requiring participation in SJT, contrary
to the spirit of that rule. The court of appeals therefore reversed the district
court decision because Rule 16(c)(7) does not provide authority for compelling
participation in SJT. "
The Strandell court further stated that mandatory use of SJT would violate
122. The term 'experimental use' includes the notion of voluntariness, as is emphasized by the
conference's refusal to include the word 'mandatory' in its final resolution. N. Spiegel, supra note
25, at S263. But cf. DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES, supra note 10, at 43 (arguing that by
endorsing the experimental use of SJT, the Conference rejected the suggestion that SJT be used only
when the parties voluntarily agree to it).
123. The StrandeU court noted:
The drafters of Rule 16 certainly intended to provide, in the pretrial conference, "a
neutral forum" for discussing the matter of settlement. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory
committee's note . . . . While the drafters intended that the trial judge "explorle] the
use of procedures other than litigation to resolve the dispute, "-including "urging the
litigants to employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse, "-they clearly did
not intend to require the parties to take part in such activities.
838 F.2d at 887 (citing FED R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note) (emphasis added).
124. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887; FED. R. Civ. P. 16. "In our view while the pretrial
conference of Rule 16 was intended to foster settlement through the use of extrajudicial procedures,
it was not intended to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked from the normal course of
litigation." Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
125. 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that imposition of sanctions against a doctor for
failing to settle before trial was a pressure tactic by a trial judge to coerce settlement and was
impermissible under Rule 16(c)(7)).
126. Id. at 669.
127. Id. (citing advisory committee's note, 97 F.R.D. 205, 210 (1983)).
128. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887 ("We must respectfully disagree with the district court. We
do not believe that [the provisions of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16(c)(7) and (11)] can be read
as authorizing a mandatory summary jury trial.") (emphasis in original).
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the work product doctrine."2  The court found that the federal rules were
adopted to reflect the balance between the "need for pretrial disclosure and party
confidentiality. ""' The court reasoned that mandatory SJT may upset this
balance and that the Supreme Court and Congress would not attempt such a
dramatic change in procedure in such an implicit fashion.' 3
2. McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc.
Like the district court in Strandell, the Eastern District of Kentucky in
McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc. 3 2 found that mandatory SJT is a valid pretrial
settlement device. 33 McKay, however, seemed to be a more appropriate case
for mandatory SJT than Strandell." While the Strandell case involved
constitutional claims 35 and a single plaintiff and defendant, the McKay case
was a wrongful discharge claim that involved multiple parties. "
129. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888. In this instance, it seems that use of the mandatory SJT would
infringe upon the work product doctrine. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3). During discovery, the plaintiffs took statements of 21 witnesses, the identity of
whom the plaintiffs learned from the defendant. After discovery was closed, the defendant filed a
motion to compel production of the witnesses' statements. The motion was denied because of lack
of undue hardship or substantial need. StrandeU, 838 F.2d at 885. Under these circumstances, it
is right to deny a mandatory SJT because the SJT proceeding would constitute free discovery for an
apparently lazy defendant. Id. at 888. See Maatman, supra note 33, at 472 (reasoning that a party
should not be required to participate in SJT if it would force the litigant to divulge privileged
information prior to a full trial on the merits). In most cases, this concern is unwarranted given the
liberal discovery rules in federal court. See Harges, supra note 31, at 808-09 (asserting that the
situation in StrandeU is rare and, generally, mandatory SIT would not infringe on the work product
privilege).
130. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888; cf. A. Spiegel, supra note 30 at 835 (stating that Judge Spiegel
has had no work product doctrine problems in conducting SJTs). In Judge Spiegel's experience,
lawyers have been prepared and have diligently presented their cases. He also stated, "Lawyers in
my court know that I will not countenance any surprises, blindsiding, or trial by ambush, and that
this philosophy applies to discovery, pretrial proceedings, summary jury trials, and the trial on the
merits, so the likelihood of that concern being realized is remote." Id.
131. Id. See Maatman, supra note 33, at 472-77 (arguing that a district court's power to
promote judicial efficiency cannot subordinate the individual's rights or upset the balance embodied
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
132. 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
133. Id. at 49 (holding that "participation in summary jury trials may be mandated by trial
courts in their discretion even aside from the existence of a local rule").
134. See supra note 113 (explaining that cases involving police brutality art not amenable to
SJT).
135. Id.
136. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 44. The McKay case concerned alleged illegal bribes to Middle
Eastern officials by Ashland Oil representatives. The plaintiffs asserted that their refusal to
participate in the illegal activities resulted in their wrongful discharge. For more background
information on the McKay case, see the related shareholder derivative suit, Howes v. Atkins, 668
F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
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In holding that it had authority to compel the parties to participate in
mandatory SJT, the McKay court relied on the existence of a local rule that
allowed the judge discretion to set any civil case for SJT.'37 Kentucky's Local
Rule 23 was adopted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83, which
authorizes districts to make rules governing their practice as long as those rules
do not conflict with the Federal Rules."s The McKay court criticized the
Seventh Circuit Strandell opinion and held that even absent the existence of a
local rule, 39 "a trial court's requiring participation in a summary jury trial is
all but expressly authorized by [the] provision of Rule 16."'"
The conflicting opinions of Strandell and McKay have generated substantial
debate about whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize mandatory
SJT and whether local rules providing for mandatory SJT make a stronger
argument for the validity of mandatory SJT.I4  The McKay court argued that
it was in a stronger position than the Strandell court because it relied upon a
local rule providing for mandatory SJT.I42 This argument is questionable,
because whether mandatory SJT is consistent with the provisions of Rule 16 is
uncertain.
Judge Lambros, in reconciling the cases, cited Rule 83 as providing
137. See supra note 104. LoCAL RULE 23 states: "A judge may, in his discretion, set any
civil case for summary jury trial or other alternative method of dispute resolution" (quoting McKay,
120 F.R.D. at 44).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 states: "Each district court . . .may . . . make and amend rules
governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules."
139. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 49 (stating that the McKay court was in a stronger position than
the Strandell court because of the existence of Local Rule 23, but holding that SJT may be mandated
at the discretion of the trial court even without the existence of a local rule).
140. Id. at 48. The court stated that the SJT procedure does not conflict with the provisions
in Rule 16, which authorize the trial court to "take action" with regard to "the use of extrajudicial
procedures" and other matters that would aid in the disposition of the action. Id. (citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 16(c)(7) and (11)). It is questionable whether SJT is an extrajudicial procedure within the
meaning of Rule 16(c). The SJT procedure encourages settlement by offering a prediction of the
trial outcome. The SJT occurs under close judicial supervision and consumes significant court
resources. The direct involvement of judges, magistrates, and jurors mikes the procedure effective
and also makes the procedure resource intensive, which inhibits frequent use. See SETTLEMENT
STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at 67-68. The advisory committee note to Rule 16(c)(7) suggests that
SIT would not qualify as an extrajudicial procedure. "In addition to settlement, Rule 16(c)(7) refers
to exploring the use of procedures other than litigation to resolve the dispute. This includes urging
litigants to employ adjudicatory techniques outside the courthouse." FED. R. CIv. P. 16 advisory
committee's note. The phrase "outside the courthouse" suggests that the committee was referring
to private ADR.
141. For a balanced treatment of arguments for and against mandatory SJT, compare Harges,
supra note 31 (arguing that mandatory SJT is within the court's inherent powers) and Maatman,
supra note 33 (arguing that mandatory SJT is not statutorily authorized and questioning the legality
of consensual SJT).
142. McKay, 120 F.R.D. at 44.
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authority for local rules mandating SJT. 43 According to Judge Lambros'
rationale, because Rule 83 authorizes local rules that are not inconsistent with
the federal rules and SJT is consistent with the provisions of Rule 16, Rule 83
authorizes local rules providing for mandatory SJT."' Many commentators
support the notion that the federal rules and the court's inherent power to control
its docket authorize mandatory SJT. 45 Others find SJT to be inconsistent with
the provisions of Rule 16, because the Federal Rules do not authorize mandatory
participation in SJT. 4  Thus, the question of whether Rule 16 provides for
mandatory SJT is still a matter for debate.
The main arguments for not compelling unwilling litigants to participate in
SJT are the need for double preparation if a settlement is not reached,147
problems related to the work product doctrine,'" and disputes about the
effectiveness of SJT. 49 Evidence also supports the notion that the high
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 83. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing Judge
Lambros' foundation for SIT).
144. Under this analysis, both the Strandell and the McKay cases would be correctly decided.
Because Kentucky had a local rule providing for mandatory SJT, it was proper to require the parties
to participate. In Strandell, there was no local rule, so compelling participation was improper. Paul
Mattingly, Comment, Compelled Participation in Summary Jury Trials: A Tale of Two Cases, 77
KY. L.J. 421, 433 (1989) (stating that a fundamental difference between Strandell and McKay is the
existence of Local Rule 23 in the Eastern District of Kentucky).
145. See Craco, supra note 13, at 495-98 (arguing that accepted uses of inherent powers in the
federal courts indicate that no further expansion of that doctrine is required to validate summary jury
trials).
146. See generally Harges, supra note 31 (arguing that while there is no express authority to
hold mandatory SIT, the federal rules should be amended, and judges should continue to use the
process under implied authority); Webber, supra note 28 (arguing that mandatory SJT is not
authorized by the Federal Rules, the court's inherent power, or the Judicial Conference Resolution).
147. Harges, supra note 31, at 807 (asserting that SJT is less expensive than a full trial but is
a labor intensive undertaking-an attorney must prepare the entire case, brief legal issues, reduce
the case to a one hour oral presentation, and draft jury instructions); A. Spiegel, supra note 30, at
835 (citing that counsels' main complaint about SIT is the extra work and expense); Interview, supra
note 59, at 7 (stating that both lawyers and clients had put so much time and energy into the SIT
that they were psychologically unwilling to try the case on the merits).
148. See generally, Strandell v. Jackson County 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987); Maatman, supra
note 34, at 472-77; supra notes 130-32.
149. See supra note 30. The effectiveness of SJT has not been scientifically verified. Judge
Posner conducted an admittedly crude study that suggested that the use of SIT does not increase
judicial efficiency. Posner, supra note 3, at 381. Judge Lambros stated a 90% success rate that
saved the Northern District of Ohio approximately $73,000.00. SIT REPORT, supra note 19, at
472-74. One commentator has noted:
We know that approximately 90% of all federal cases eventually settle. Are the cases
in which we have successfully used a summary trial ones which would have settled
anyway? . . . We cannot be sure. We feel, however, that when all the pretrial stages
of a case have been completed without demonstrating any likelihood of settlement, and
the case then continues through the entire SIT procedure before settling, this is some
indication that the case was one of the 10 % that could otherwise have been expected to
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settlement rate of SJT proceedings merely reflects the ninety percent settlement
rate of the federal courts in general. '" Even those commentators who oppose
SJT, however, acknowledge its popularity. 15' Some commentators, despite
finding no express authorization for invoking the procedure, agree that the rules
should be amended to allow for its use.'52
B. Impanelling Jurors for Summary Jury Trial
Notwithstanding the debate over judicial authority to compel participation
in SJT, judges do not have express authority to impanel a jury to sit for SJT
even when the use of SJT is voluntary. The use of a jury is the foundation of
the SJT procedure that distinguishes it from other methods of dispute
resolution.'53  At least one court has expressed doubts about the judicial
authority to impanel jurors from the regular jury pool to serve as SJT
jurors."' The following sections examine the bases that have been proposed
as providing authority for using regular jurors in SJT proceedings. The sections
conclude that federal judges lack express statutory authority to impanel jurors
for participation in SJT proceedings.
1. The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 Does Not Authorize
Judges to Impanel Summary Jurors
Judge Battisti, of the Northern District of Ohio, has held that Congress has
go to trial.
Blueprint, supra note 24, at 888.
150. Gwin, supra note 67, at 57. But cf. Blueprint, supra note 24, at 888 (arguing that
although 90% of all cases settle, it is unclear whether the cases that settle through SJT would have
settled without the procedure).
151. See Posner, supra note 3, at 368 (stating that while he does raise questions about SJT, he
recognizes that the procedure has energized the field of procedural reform); Webber, supra note 28,
at 1498 (recognizing the spread of the use of SJT to federal and state courts).
152. See, e.g., Harges, supra note 31. Although there is no express statutory authorization for
judges to conduct SJT, the SJT has proven to be an effective form of ADR and judges should
continue to use it, even if the Federal Rules are not amended. Id.
153. Judicial involvement in the procedure gives SJT validity. Judicial involvement gives the
participants confidence that the settlement is "correct" and that their rights have been vindicated.
SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at 74 (asserting that judicial involvement in SJT is
important because the mechanism is designed to convince a client that the likelihood of prevailing
at trial is not as great as the client perceives it to be); Judge's Role, supra note 40, at 1375
(reasoning that jury participation is important for the SJT to meet courtroom objectives and
expectations of the litigants).
154. Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506 (N. D. Ohio 1990) (holding that federal
district judges have no authority to summon persons to serve as summary jurors). Interestingly, in
Strandell the Seventh Circuit left open the question of whether district courts have the authority to
impanel jurors for SJT. The issue was raised by plaintiffs' counsel, but the Seventh Circuit did not
address the issue. Maatman, supra note 33, at 477 n.98, and accompanying text.
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not authorized the impanelling of jurors to participate in SJT. In Hume v. M &
C Management,5 Battisti denied the parties' joint motion to submit the case
to a summary jury trial.'m Further, he has refused to use summary jurors
from the qualified jury wheel as long as regular jurors are selected from the
same wheel." 7 The Hume decision raises important questions about the
authority of judges to impanel jurors to sit for SJTs.
The first section of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968'" provides
that "all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand
and petit juries in district courts of the United States and shall have an obligation
to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose."59 There is, however,
no similar obligation for citizens to serve as jurors for SJT.' ° Although
citizens have no obligation to serve as summary jurors, it is unlikely that those
impanelled on a summary jury would have the opportunity to refuse to serve.
To ensure a conscientious verdict, many summary juries are not told until the
verdict is returned that their verdict is for purposes of facilitating settlement only
and is not binding.'6'
Because citizens have no obligation to serve as jurors for SJT, they cannot
be punished for refusing to do so. The Jury Selection and Service Act provides
155. 129 F.R.D. at 506.
156. Id. at 510. ("The Joint Motion is overruled. Until Congress authorizes the federal courts
to summon citizens for service other than for grand and petit juries, the result obtained through this
Order seems to be the only one permissible in law."). It is very unusual that the parties themselves
would move for participation in SJT.
157. Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 506; United States v. Exum, 744 F. Supp. 803, aff'd, 748 F. Supp.
512 (1990) (stating that no jury trials will be conducted in any case assigned to Judge Battisti's
docket until a new jury wheel is selected in accordance with the duly enacted laws of the United
States, because the language of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1867 demands this result). 28 U.S.C.A. § 1867
states in pertinent part, "If the court determines that there has been a substantial failure to comply
with the provisions of this title in selecting the petit jury, the court shall stay the proceedings
pending the selection of a petit jury in conformity with this title." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1867(d) (West
1966 & Supp. 1992).
158. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 1968 & Supp. 1991).
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. "The fact that Congress appropriates money for jurors without indicating how jurors are
to be used does not empower federal judges to summon jurors to serve as mediators." N. Spiegel,
supra note 25, at S264. But cf. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 1968 & Supp. 1991) (indicating that
jurors are to be used only as grand or petit jurors).
161. See supra note 75. This presents the question of whether this practice would constitute
false imprisonment or involuntary servitude. "Jury service is a form of conscription; and
conscription is not popular in this or any other country." Posner, supra note 3, at 386. This is
especially egregious when the jurors are under the impression that they must serve or face the
possibility of imprisonment. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1866(g) (West 1966 & Supp. 1991) (stating that "any
person who fails to show good cause for noncompliance with a summons may be fined not more
than $100 or imprisoned not more than three days, or both"). See infra notes 162-63 and
accompanying text.
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for punishment of those persons who fail "to show good cause for
noncompliance with the summons." 62 Those individuals who fail to show
good cause for noncompliance either may be fined not more than $100,
imprisoned not more than three days, or both." Because summary jurors are
neither grand nor petit jurors, and therefore not bound by the Jury Selection and
Service Act, they cannot be punished for not complying with the summons.
But, because summary jurors are not told until after the case is decided that they
are not serving on a regular jury, the summary jurors are unaware that they
cannot be punished for noncompliance until it is too late.
The purpose of the petit jury and the summary jury differ greatly. A petit
jury is defined as "the ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal
action .... " " In contrast, a summary jury is convened solely to facilitate
pretrial settlement between the parties in an effort to avoid trial.' The Sixth
Circuit relied heavily on this distinction in holding that the First Amendment
right of access does not apply to SJT proceedings.'6
A petit jury's verdict binds the parties, while the parties can accept or
refuse a summary jury verdict. In Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. v. General
Electric Co. ,67 the court relied on this distinction in holding that the public
has no right of access to SJT proceedings." The appellants in that case
argued that SJT proceedings should be open to the public because the settlement
162. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1864(b) (West 1966 & Supp. 1991) (stating that "any person who fails to
appear pursuant to [a summons to appear for failure to return a juror qualification form] or who fails
to show good cause for noncompliance with the summons may be fined not more than $100 or
imprisoned not more than three days, or both").
163. Id. Although the Act provides punishment for citizens unwilling to serve, this is rarely
done. In the past 50 years, only two citizens have been held in contempt of court for failure to
serve. See United States v. Hillyard, 52 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Wash. 1943) (contempt action against
member of Jehovah's Witness dismissed); In re Jaye, 90 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (holding that
where an individual refused to take his seat in the jury box and exited the courtroom displaying
aggressive and willful behavior, summary contempt proceedings were appropriate, and the individual
had to serve 48 hours of confinement).
164. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 768 (5th ed. 1979).
165. Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 508-09 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
166. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 905 (6th Cir. 1988)
(reasoning that SJT is, at every turn, a pretrial settlement technique and, historically, settlement
techniques have been closed to the press and public). Just as the public is not entitled to observe
traditional negotiations leading to settlement, the claim of the public's right of access to this
information fails. Id.
167. 854 F.2d at 900.
168. Id. at 905 (reasoning that settlement negotiations do not have a history of openness and
that there is no matter presented to the court for adjudication because SJT is not binding). 6th
Circuit Conference, supra note 17, app. D at 298 (stating that SJT proceedings are not open to the
public). But cf DISPUTE RESOLUTION DEVICES, supra note 10, at 20 (asserting that SJT is usually
public).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 2 [1993], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol27/iss2/6
1993] SUMMARY JURY TRIALS 485
has a final decisive effect on the litigation." The appellants equated SJT
proceedings with preliminary criminal hearings that must be open to the public
because of their decisive effect on criminal cases." 7  The Sixth Circuit
rejected this argument, stating that the proceedings in Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court' "resulted in a binding judicial determination which directly
affected the rights of the parties."'" In contrast, the Cincinnati Gas court
found that the SJT "does not present any matter for adjudication by the
court."' 3 This court stated that "it is the presence of the exercise of a court's
coercive powers that is the touchstone of the recognized right to access, not the
presence of a procedure that might lead the parties to voluntarily terminate the
litigation." 74 The parties themselves agree whether they are to be bound by
the verdict; thus, the judge and jury play no adjudicative role in SJT
proceedings.
Another significant difference is the manner in which evidence is presented
to the juries. A primary function of the petit jury is to evaluate witness
credibility. 75 Ordinarily in SJT, live witness testimony is not allowed. 76
169. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 904. Appellants asserted that public access to the proceedings
would have therapeutic community value because of the importance of the nuclear power and utility
rates issues raised in the case. The court disagreed, reasoning that the appellees had a legitimate
interest in confidentiality and that public access to the SJT would have an adverse effect on the
utility of the procedure as a settlement device. Id.
170. Id. (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1986)).
171. 478 U.S. at 1.
172. Cincinnati Gas, 854 F.2d at 905 (rejecting the appellant's argument, the court noted that
the public would have no entitlement to observe any negotiation leading to a traditional settlement
of the case).
173. Id. (rejecting this argument, the court equated SIT with other traditional forms of
settlement negotiations as opposed to a preliminary hearing, which has a binding or decisive effect).
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. Evaluation of witness demeanor is recognized as an important function of the jury that is
lost in SJT. See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text. Therefore, it is generally believed that
in cases where witness credibility is important, SJT is inappropriate. Maatman, supra note 33, at
483. Some attorneys believe witness credibility is always important to the outcome of a case. N.
Spiegel, supra note 25, at S255 n.27. The disadvantage of not having the opportunity to evaluate
witness credibility has not gone unnoticed by the summary jurors. Some jurors responding to an
open-ended question about the difference in understandability between a full trial and SJT
commented: "All depended on the presentation of two lawyers-no witnesses, no cross-examination,
no arguments. Too much seemed left unsaid . . . ."; "You really do not hear enough of the
evidence."; "The summary jury trial left too much to the imagination, whereas the regular jury trial
gave a clearer picture through visual contact with the persons involved." JACOUBOVITCH & MOORE,
supra note 20, at 22.
176. In some instances, the SJT procedure has been modified to allow for a limited number of
live witnesses. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 334 (S.D. I11. 1987). Also, one
judge has allowed videotaped testimony from expert witnesses to be viewed by the summary jury.
See supra note 63. Generally, it is believed that in cases in which witness credibility is a substantial
factor, SIT is inappropriate. A. Spiegel, supra note 30, at 835. But cf. Harges, supra note 31, at
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Relaxed evidentiary and procedural rules allow summary juries to base their
decisions on evidence that would normally be excluded at a formal trial."7
A summary jury hears only the lawyer's representations of the facts and
issues." The summary jury's verdict turns on the credibility of the attorney
rather than the credibility of the witnesses. 7  Given the different purposes
served by petit and summary juries, the Jury Selection and Service Act cannot
be read so broadly as to include or authorize summary juries."0
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(c) Does Not Expressly Authorize
the Impanelling of Summary Jurors
Judge Lambros equates the use of a summary jury with that of an advisory
jury and thus uses Rule 39(c)... as the foundation for impanelling a summary
jury."s According to Rule 39(c), "In all actions not triable of right by a jury,
the court upon its own motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an
advisory jury . . . ."'i Judge Lambros believes that while Rule 39(c)
provides for advisory juries only in cases not triable as of right by a jury, such
as in equity cases, the idea of the summary jury fits within the spirit of the
rule."' According to Judge Lambros, "[T]he clear purpose behind the Rule
.... is to give the court and the parties the opportunity to utilize a jury's
particular expertise and perception when a case demands those special
abilities."' Judge Lambros' interpretation of Rule 39(c) is overbroad.,s
811 (asserting that very few cases are determined solely by the credibility of a witness as judged by
his or her demeanor on the stand; thus, concern about SIT use when witness credibility is a factor
is without merit).
177. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 904 (6th Cir. 1988)
(citing A. Spiegel, supra note 30, at 830-31).
178. But see supra note 74.
179. Gwin, supra note 67, at 57 (asserting that a primary disadvantage of SIT is the inability
of the judge and jury to assess witness credibility, and the opportunity to judge only the lawyers'
credibility).
180. See Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
181. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c) states:
(c) Advisory Jury and Trial by Consent. In all actions not triable of right by a jury the
court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury or,
except in actions against the United States when a statute of the United States provides
for trial without a jury, the court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial
with a jury whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of
right.
182. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 52.
183. FED R. Civ. P. 39(c) (emphasis added).
184. Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 52 (stating that the idea behind SIT is similar to Rule
39(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-the advisory jury).
185. EXPERIMENTATION AND THE LAW: REP. OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER ADVISORY
COMM. ON EXPERIMENTATION IN THE LAW 41 (Federal Judicial Center 1981).
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Historically, a judge in a court of equity-where there was no right to a
trial by jury-could appoint an advisory jury to "enlighten. . .the conscience
of the chancellor." 18 7 The advisory jury was used to give the judge a sense
of the standards and morality of the community. 8 In fact, one state supreme
court has held that a court of equity must use an advisory jury when deciding
certain types of obscenity claims.'89 Using an advisory jury to evaluate facts
in light of community standards is the purpose of advisory juries, and Rule 39(c)
was intended to codify this use."g  Rule 39(c) was intended to expand the
traditional practice of advisory jury use to include trials where no right to a jury
exists.' 9' Contrary to the provisions in Rule 39(c), however, summary juries
are impanelled in actions that are triable to a jury as of right.'" The
differences in the rationale behind the use of advisory juries and summary juries
suggest that a summary jury is not an advisory jury within the meaning and
spirit of Rule 39(c).'
186. Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 508 n.5 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (explaining
that Rule 39(c) is an authorized exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1861 for the narrow purpose of aiding the
judge).
187. Richard E. Guggenheim, A Note on the Advisory Jury in Federal Courts, 8 FED. B.J. 200
(1947); Note, Practice and Potential of the Advisory Jury, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1364 (1987)
[hereinafter Advisory Jury]. In equity, an advisory verdict was only "the discretionary right of the
court to have its 'conscience enlightened'.. .. " Vosburg Co. v. Watts, 221 F. 402, 408 (4th Cir.
1915).
188. Charles Hatfield, Note, The Summary Jury Trial: Who Will Speak for the Jurors? 1991
J. DISP. RESOL. 151, 155 (stating that Federal Rule 39(c) reflects the awareness of the courts'
historical need for community input since the chancellor in pre-Constitution courts of equity enjoyed
authority to impanel an advisory jury in cases requiring application of community standards);
Advisory Jury, supra note 187, at 1364.
189. McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Mo. 1975) (en banc) (holding that although
jurors are not ordinarily involved in cases for injunctive relief, in obscenity cases the judge should
permit jurors to ascertain contemporary community standards).
190. Hatfield, supra note 188, at 156 (stating that judges have historically used advisory juries
in cases that would not be triable as of right to a jury but need the input of the community and that
Rule 39(c) codifies that practice). See Computer Systems Eng'g Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 571 F. Supp.
1365, 1373 (D. Mass. 1983) (reasoning that using an advisory jury for trial of legal issues in which
a jury right has been waived is permissible because a jury is better equipped to handle legal issues).
191. N. Spiegel, supra note 25, at S262 n.75. See, e.g., Kohn v. McNulta, 147 U.S. 238, 240
(1893) (stating that the advisory jury verdict is not binding on the court. The court can adopt it in
full, in part, or completely disregard it); Cities Serv. Co. v. Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co., 758
F.2d 1063, 1071 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that an advisory jury does no more than advise the judge).
192. SIT has been used to settle a variety of cases, such as negligence, personal injury,
products liability, toxic tort, contract, discrimination, admiralty, and antitrust actions. SJT REPORT,
supra note 19, at 472. Most, if not all, of the cases assigned to SIT are triable as of right to a jury,
contrary to the Rule 39(c) advisory jury provision. See JACOUBOVITCH & MOORE, supra note 20,
at 3 (stating that SIT is used in cases that would normally go before a jury).
193. See Posner, supra note 3, at 385 (arguing that Rule 39(c) excludes SIT because SIT is
used in actions triable of right to a jury. The advisory committee's note to Rule 39(c) explains that
Rule 39(c) codifies the traditional practice in equity, maritime law, and other ndnjury fields whereby
judges could convene juries to advise them on questions of fact); Maatman, supra note 33, at 478
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The purpose of the advisory jury is to aid the judge in determining issues
of fact in a case not triable as of right to a jury."' In contrast, the purpose
of the summary jury is to aid the parties in their settlement negotiations. In his
article, Summary Jury Trials and Other Methods of Dispute Resolution, Judge
Posner stated:
[T]he summary jury is not an advisory jury. It does not advise the
judge how to decide the case, but is used to push the parties to settle.
It is therefore outside the scope of rule 39(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which deals with advisory juries.'9
Advisory juries were intended to aid the judge in deciding equity cases."
They were not intended to provide a pretrial settlement tool for the parties. '"
Given the competing objectives behind the use of advisory juries and summary
juries, interpreting Rules 39(c) to authorize the convening of a summary jury is
tenuous at best.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF USING REGULAR
JURORS AS SUMMARY JURORS
This Section examines the advantages and disadvantages of using regular
jurors as SJT jurors and concludes that the use of regular jurors as SJT jurors
is a valid and efficient practice. Arguments have been made that using the
regular jury pool for the selection of summary jurors alters the jury selection
process." In United States v. Exum,"98 Judge Battisti again questioned and
criticized the use of regular jurors as summary jurors. Judge Battisti examined
the jury selection plan for the Northern District of Ohio and found that the use
of summary jurors from the qualified jury pool altered the regular jury selection
process.'
(stating that Rule 39(c) authorizes the district court to call an advisory jury only in equity cases, and
therefore provides no support for convening a jury for SJT); Hume v. M & C Management, 129
F.R.D. 506, 508 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (asserting that six persona convened solely for the purpose of
facilitating settlement is unauthorized by the legislature). But cf. Harges, supra note 85, at 817
(stating that summary jury is analogous to a Rule 39(c) advisory jury).
194. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c) advisory committee's note.
195. Posner, supra note 3, at 385.
196. CHARLES A. WtIoHT & ARTHUR R. MiLt.LER, 9 FEDERAL PRACTnCE § 2335 (1971)
(emphasis added).
197. "The [advisory] jury acts merely as an aid to the judge .... JAMES WM. MOORE &
Jo D. LuCAS, 5 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 39. 10[1], at 39-40 (2d ed. 1991) (emphasis added).
198. United States v. Exum, 744 F. Supp. 803, affd, 748 F. Supp. 512 (1990).
199. Id.
200. Exum, 744 F. Supp. at 804 (arguing that using summary jurors from the regular jury pool
distorts juror utilization statistics because it appears that more jurors were used than actually were).
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According to thejury selection plan for the Northern District of Ohio, upon
a judge's request, a panel of prospective jurors is drawn from the qualified jury
wheel. These potential jurors can be: 1) called to the jury box, serve as jurors,
and be discharged, 2) called to the jury box, challenged, and returned to the
qualified jury wheel, or 3) not called to the jury box (leftover jurors), and
retained on the qualified jury wheel."0' In the Northern District of Ohio,
summary jurors are selected from either the qualified jury wheel or from the
leftover jurors.' °
According to Judge Battisti, the use of leftover jurors creates a "distortion
in juror utilization statistics by creating the appearance of higher juror
utilization." 3 The appearance of higher juror utilization occurs because
jurors impanelled to serve as summary jurors do not serve immediately and
many times are not given a specific date for actual service.3' Sometimes,
jurors impanelled for summary juries never serve at all if the SJT does not go
forward."'
Proponents of SJT, however, argue that the use of regular jurors as
summary jurors actually increases juror utilization and decreases government
expense.' In many instances, those who serve as summary jurors are
leftover jurors who will be paid for one day of jury service even though they did
not serve on a petit jury. 7 Participating in an SJT allows leftover jurors to
"earn" the money they would otherwise receive even though they did not
participate on a regular jury.'
201. Id.
202. Id. Initially, summary jury panels were only drawn directly from the qualified jury wheel.
Since April 1990, leftover jurors have also been selected for summary jury duty.
203. Id.
204. Id. "[Alpproximately 200 potential jurors have been diverted from petit jury service to
summary jury service." Many of these jurors were still waiting for the selection of the date of the
SJT for which they were to serve as jurors. Id. But for their assignment to summary jury service,
these individuals would have remained in the qualified jury wheel. Id.
205. Id. In these instances, potential jurors are excused from jury service without ever having
served on a jury. In April 1990 in the Northern District of Ohio, 37 summary jury panels had been
sworn in, but only eight of those SJTs had actually occurred. Id.
206. SIT REPORT, supra note 19, at 473, explaining that 49 SJTs saved $73,702 or roughly
$1,504 per case. This was accomplished because jurors are only used-and therefore only paid-for
one day as compared to four days for an average trial. Also, only 10 perspective jurors are called,
thereby eliminating a long line of challenged, and thus unused-but compensated-jurors. But see
supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
207. SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 473 (asserting that SJT actually can increase juror
utilization by recycling jurors-using jurors who have been challenged or have not been selected to
serve on SJT. The jurors are being compensated whether they are utilized or not, so it makes sense
to use them whenever possible.).
208. See Hatfield, supra note 188, at 151; SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 473-74 (citing
statistics on the savings of using jurors in SIT).
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Courts and commentators have expressed concern that the use of jurors in
SJT might compromise the integrity of the judicial system and thereby diminish
public confidence in the system.2 9 To encourage conscientious deliberation,
most judges do not tell the jury until after it has rendered its verdict that the
outcome is nonbinding."0 To calm jurors' suspicions about the absence of
live witnesses and the shortened trial, one judge explains to the jury that the
parties have elected a streamlined procedure for resolving their dispute.2" If
this method of telling the summary jurors white lies or half-truths continues, it
is feared that an overall decline in jury conscientiousness and confidence in the
system will result.2"2 If jurors have the notion that in some cases they are
exercising a governmental power in rendering a binding verdict and in other
cases merely acting as fact-finding mediators in a private dispute, the
conscientiousness of the jurors' decisions will decline in both SJT proceedings
and in full trials."'
The concern about the long-term effects of SJT on the conscientiousness of
jury verdicts will be eliminated if the jurors are told in advance that they will
be participating in an SJT, which is already done in some jurisdictions." 4
However, although arguments have been made that telling jurors in advance that
209. See generally Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (stating
that SJT may compromise the integrity of the jury system because jurors will become less
conscientious about their duties if they learn that some verdicts are nonbinding); Posner, supra note
3, at 387 (arguing that as word spreads that juries sometimes make decisions and sometimes simply
referee fake trials, the conscientiousness of jurors as a whole will decline).
210. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
211. Zatz, supra note 24, at 107-08 (reasoning that not telling jurors until after the verdict is
returned that their decision is nonbinding encourages realistic and conscientious deliberations).
212. Hume, 129 F.R.D. at 508 n.4 (arguing that using jurors in a summary jury without the
jurors' knowledge raises ethical considerations about the propriety of using individuals in an
experimental setting without their knowledge or consent); Hatfield, supra note 188, at 57 (using the
regular jury panel to call summary jurors affects the judgment of jurors in regular trials as well as
summary jury trials).
213. See Posner, supra note 3, at 386-87. While Posner argues that not telling jurors at the
outset of the SJT that the verdict is nonbinding will undermine the jury system, he believes that
telling the jurors in advance will reduce the verdict's informational value, eliminate the principal
advantage of SJT, and call into question the entire rationale of the device. Id. at 386. Posner
suggests holding summary bench trials in lieu of SJT, but then rejects the idea because bench trials
in the federal system are usually only half as long as jury trials, and thus the potential benefits are
smaller. Id. at 387.
214. Harges, supra note 33, at 809-10. United States District Court Judge William Young, of
the District of Massachusetts, believes that concern with jury conscientiousness is unwarranted. In
SJTs conducted in his court, the jurors are told in advance that their verdict is nonbinding, and he
believes the summary jurors take their jobs seriously and render verdicts that fairly predict the result
of a full trial. Id. But see Posner, supra note 3, at 386-87 (arguing that to inform the jurors in
advance defeats the purpose of the SJT procedure and that jurors' knowledge of nonbinding verdicts
undermines the system no matter when in the proceeding the jurors are told).
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the verdict is nonbinding will change the verdict," 5 jurors generally have
indicated that this is not the case.2 16  In fact, summary jurors who were
interviewed indicated that they did not mind being told after the verdict was
entered that their decision was nonbinding.2"7 The vast majority of these
jurors believed it would be detrimental to tell jurors in advance that the verdict
is nonbinding.
21
While there is a lack of express authority for using potential petit jurors as
summary jurors, it is clear that the SJT process has enjoyed a great deal of
success."" Both judges and attorneys who have participated in SJT find it to
be beneficial. Even attorneys who were initially skeptical of the procedure-and
reluctant to use it-have found SJT to be successful and beneficial.' The
215. SErrLEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at 73 n. 186. Studies indicate that this concern
is invalid. Mock jurors who are aware of the hypothetical nature of their deliberations show a high
degree of emotional involvement in their work, and their verdicts fairly predict actual trial results.
Id. See also Harges, supra note 31, at 809 (arguing that concern about jury conscientiousness is
invalid). But see Blueprint, supra note 24, at 890. In difficult or highly emotional cases, jurors
have conceded that knowing in advance that their verdict was nonbinding would have made a
difference. Id. For example, an SIT was held in a case in which an infant had been crippled for
life by scalding water. The defendant was a Fortune 500 company that was able to pay any damage
award. The summary jurors returned a verdict of nonliability. While the decision was difficult
because the jurors had seen the child in the courtroom, they nevertheless felt bound by the law not
to award damages. Several of the jurors admitted that had they known the verdict was only
advisory, they would have found liability in an effort to help the child reach a settlement with the
defendant. Id.
216. Enslen, supra note 29, at 106. Judge Enslen had the summary jurors in the groundwater
contamination SIT fill out an exit questionnaire, which he now uses in all SJTs. Id. Of the 10
jurors questioned, all agreed that they should not have been told in the beginning that it was an SJT.
Id. Nine out of the 10 said that they would have reached the same decision if they had known the
verdict was nonbinding. Id.
217. Zatz, supra note 24, at 112 (stating that of the 10 jurors interviewed, none was angry
about the way they were told about the nonbinding nature of their verdict or about the way their time
had been used). This was so even though one juror revealed that she had not slept either night of
the SIT because of the burden of her responsibility. Id.
218. Blueprint, supra note 24, at 890 (citing juror approval of waiting until the verdict is
returned to tell jurors SJT is a nonbinding procedure); JACOUBOVITCH & MOORE, supra note 20,
at 21-25 (citing results from a survey of jurors in SIT which indicated that jurors believe SIT is a
worthwhile procedure for the litigants and a worthwhile use of the jurors' time); see also supra note
216.
219. See supra notes 100-04 (discussing proliferation of SIT use in federal district courts).
220. "The attorney who objected to the first summary jury trial he was required to participate
in is now the biggest local fan of the procedure." McKay v. Ashland Oil Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 49
(E.D. Ky. 1988). After an SJT presentation to more than 200 attorneys in the Western District of
Michigan, the concept was so well received that attorneys are welcoming SJT as a worthwhile tool
in resolving disputes. 6th Circuit Conference, supra note 17, at 15; see also id. at app. C at 6
(stating that lawyers and litigants are automatically opposed to anything new and innovative, if they
have not thought of it themselves, but after a trial run almost all of them react favorably to the SIT
procedure and attempt to make it work).
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main reason expressed for the success of SJT is that the parties receive the
opinion of a jury without the time and expense of a lengthy jury trial." Even
if the SJT fails to result in settlement, the nonbinding nature of the verdict has
no effect on a party's right to a full de novo trial.' Also, attorneys have
found that participation in an SJT enables them to prepare their cases well in
advance and, if the SJT does not result in a settlement, offers a unique
opportunity to "practice" their case.M
V. PROPOSED REFORM
Despite questionable support from the legislature, the SJT procedure
receives strong support from the judiciary.' Even with judicial endorsement
of the experimental use of SJT, however, Judge Battisti's assertion that judges
lack authority to impanel jurors for SJT deserves careful consideration. The
authority for federal district court judges to impanel summary jurors from the
court's jury pool is currently based on the assertion that summary juries are
advisory juries. '  As Judge Posner has indicated, jury service is a form of
conscription, albeit a mild one.' Courts should not deceive jurors into
believing that serving on an SJT jury is a duty of citizenship, because it is not.
Congress must give courts express authority to impanel jurors to sit for SJT.
There have been solutions proposed to remedy the problem of lack of
express authority to impanel jurors, but none of these proposals are sufficient.
Some courts have attempted to solve the problem of jury-tainting by having a
separate jury wheel for SJT jurors. 7  This solution is inadequate because it
does not address the fundamental problem: the courts' lack of authority to
impanel summary jurors.
221. Harges, supra note 33, at 805-06 (reasoning that because SJT usually lasts no more than
a day, endless days in court, high attorneys fees, and witness costs are avoided while still .allowing
the litigants to have their day in court); Morgan, supra note 56, at 500 (stating that SJT gives the
litigants their day in court and forces them to fully prepare their cases).
222. SJT REPORT, supra note 19, at 469 (explaining that SJT is a nonbinding, predictive tool
that in no way affects the parties' rights to a full trial on the merits).
223. SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 25, at 76 (stating that SJT reduces demands on
courts even when settlement does not occur, because SJIT acts as a "dress rehearsal" for the full
trial).
224. See supra note 116.
225. See supra notes 181-97 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional use of advisory
juries).
226. See supra note 161.
227. See Lambros & Shunk, supra note 8, at 47 n.22 (explaining that summary jurors are kept
on separate duty tracks); A. Spiegel, supra note 30, at 830 (noting that jurors who participate in SJT
are segregated so they will not participate on full trials thereafter); Interview, supra note 59, at 7
(noting that summary jurors are kept on a separate list so jurors won't mingle and discuss the two
different types of trials-a full trial as compared to an ST).
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Also, encouraging district courts to enact local rules to provide for
summary jury use,' which might seem to be an effective solution, will not
solve the problem of lack of express authority. Nothing in the Federal Rules
authorizes the use of summary jurors. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83
provides: "Each district court ... may ... make and amend rules governing
its practice not inconsistent with these rules."' Rule 39(c) provides for the
use of advisory juries used at common law to aid the judge in equity cases.'
However, the advisory jury is impaneled to help the judge render a binding
decision, while the summary jury is impanelled to help the parties decide the
monetary value of their case. The use of summary juries is inconsistent with the
spirit of Rule 39(c).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and Congress must
authorize any expansion of their power. Congress can and should amend the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to provide for the use of summary jurors.
Specifically, Congress should amend Rule 39 to provide for the use of summary
juries. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(d) could be added to
provide for summary jury trials by stating, "The district court, with the consent
of all parties to the suit, may impanel from the regular jury pool a summary jury
to sit for a summary jury trial, the purpose of which is to render a nonbinding
verdict, unless all parties agree to be bound, in an effort to assist the parties in
settlement negotiations." Such an amendment would not represent a dramatic
procedural change, but would merely codify the existing practice of many
district courts."
One merit of the amendment is that it would resolve Judge Battisti's
contention by providing statutory authority for calling citizens to summary jury
service. 2 2  The proposed amendment would also encourage reluctant
jurisdictions to try the procedure by giving courts the express authority to
impanel summary jurors. Another merit of the amendment is that it provides
for voluntary use of SJT and thus resolves the dispute between the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits. Finally, the amendment would create uniformity in SJT
practice throughout the federal court system.
228. See McKay v. Ashland Oil Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988)
229. FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (emphasis added).
230. See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text (discussing the historical purpose of
advisory juries).
231. See supra notes 101-04 (discussing the proliferation of SJT use).
232. See Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding that
federal judges have no authority to summon citizens to serve as settlement advisors).
McNamara: Summary Jury Trials:  Is There Authority for Federal Judges to Im
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1993
VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27
VI. CONCLUSION
While no single proposal will solve the problem of congestion of the federal
courts' dockets, SJT has proven to be a popular and effective means of
providing litigants with a just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of their
disputes. With the endorsement of the Judicial Conference, SJT proponents
believe that the future of the judicial system depends on mechanisms such as
SJT?3 A lack of clear legislative authority, however, hinders the use of SJT
and creates tension between the federal circuit courts. This tension is best
illustrated by the conflicting decisions of Strandell and McKay concerning
whether Congress has granted authority to hold mandatory SJTs. Also, lack of
express legislative authority leads to the result-as in the Hume and Exum
decisions-that federal judges are not authorized to impanel jurors to sit for
SJTs.
Regardless of the setbacks caused by the lack of express legislative
authority, SJT is being used with great success in several jurisdictions at both
the state and federal levels.' 4 Summary jury trials are beneficial to the court
system, the individual litigants, and the jurors. The courts benefit by disposing
of potentially lengthy cases in a short period of time. Litigants benefit by
avoiding the high attorneys' fees and witness costs associated with litigation, but
still have their day in court. Because SJT usually lasts a single day, jurors
benefit by satisfying their jury service requirement without a substantial
disruption of their routine. By amending Rule 39 to provide express authority
for impanelling summary jurors in a voluntary SJT, Congress will merely be
codifying the current practice of many jurisdictions, and thus will encourage
reluctant courts to utilize SJT as a potential means of reducing federal court
backlog.
Molly M. McNamara
233. See Interview, supra note 59, at 10 (asserting that unless we find alternative methods to
resolve disputes, we will end up blindly creating more judgeships and courthouses).
234. See supra notes 101-04.
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